Conclusions

121 In this section of our report we set out the various conclusions which we have reached in the course of making an assessment of standards and behaviour in the Defence Force in the areas of the handling of official information and relations with the Government. As we have discussed with you in the course of our inquiry, our conclusions respond to the specific questions raised in our terms of reference as well as other more general matters which have arisen in the context of making the requisite assessment.

122 On the basis of the more than 70 interviews which we have conducted (see Appendix 2), we are satisfied that in the Defence Force overall standards of integrity, commitment and professionalism are high and that there is general disapproval of the unauthorised disclosure of official information: see paragraphs 28 and 91 above.

123 While we were frequently assured that within the Defence Force there are clear and appropriate standards governing the relationship between the Defence Force and the Government of the day, we believe that the form and content of these standards is by no means as clear, comprehensive or accessible as the situation requires. It should be an early priority to fill this gap: see paragraphs 56-61 above. On the other hand, we found no reason to doubt that officers were generally well aware of their responsibilities and we certainly found no evidence of widespread disloyalty: see paragraphs 67-69 above.

124 At the same time, however, there have been a substantial number of incidents involving the unauthorised disclosure of official information relating to the Defence Force and these incidents constituted breaches of the obligation on Defence personnel not to release such information. We were not asked to identify the individuals responsible for these deliberate "leaks" and, as we have made it plain, there is no clear evidence of culpability. We were guided in most cases by the weight of opinion in the responses to our inquiry. Nevertheless it became apparent to us that they probably came largely from factions in the Army: see paragraphs 111-117 above. As far as we could tell, there were few, if any, deliberate "leaks" of information from persons in the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Force or the Ministry of Defence: see paragraphs 102-103 and 115 above.

125 As we have emphasised in our report, none of the "leaks" referred to us involved classified information or information which related to the security or defence of New Zealand: see paragraphs 92-95 above. This conclusion was confirmed by all of those responsible for the protection in New Zealand of such classified information: see paragraphs 93-94 above.

126 It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the "leaks" which occurred were originally designed to advance the interests of the Army, primarily against the interests of the other Services. Subsequently the "leaks" were designed to counter the influence of a faction in the Army by causing personal embarrassment to the CGS. These various leaks also had the consequential result of causing political embarrassment to the Government and the Minister: see paragraph 118 above.

127 In essence, with the qualifications already referred to, it seemed to us that the "leaks" occurred because -

127.1 There was widespread concern in the Defence Force, and in the Army in particular, as a result of the run-down in Defence capabilities stemming from a declining Defence budget, and the emergence of clear divisions between the two major political parties as to the purpose and structure of the Defence Force, and the consequential equipment requirements: see paragraphs 109-110 above.

127.2 There was intense competition between the three Services for their share of the funding likely to be forthcoming: see paragraph 111 above.

127.3 A group of officers in the Army decided to pursue an active "campaign" designed to ensure that the Army obtained its share of resources. One aspect of this "campaign" involved undermining the claims by the Navy and Air Force for their share of resources. This included the judicious, but deliberate "leaking" of official information to the news media: see paragraphs 112-113 above.

127.4 As a result of the perceived success of the Army "campaign" and those involved with it, another faction in the Army, for a variety of motives, reacted by deliberately "leaking" information to Opposition members of Parliament which led among other things to well directed requests for official information under the Official Information Act and Parliamentary questions which caused considerable personal embarrassment to CGS and consequential political embarrassment to the Government: see paragraph 118 above.

128 These two phases of deliberate "leaking" of official information involving different factions in the Army are not indicative of any widespread malaise either in the Defence Force or indeed in the Army: see paragraph 120 above. They have involved a relatively small number of individuals who misguidedly believed that their breaches were somehow justified: see paragraph 119 above. Some of them may now appreciate that their actions were unwise and not in the best interests of the Army. We found no evidence of any systemic problem underlying the disclosure of official information in the Defence Force.

129 We have set out in our report the steps taken by the Secretary of Defence to investigate the unauthorised disclosure of official information: see paragraphs 102-103 above. We are satisfied that these steps were adequate and appropriate in the circumstances: see paragraph 104 above.

130 We have also set out the steps taken by the Chief of Defence Force to investigate the unauthorised disclosure of official information: see paragraphs 96-98 above. Although the steps taken by the Chief of Defence Force in relation to a much greater number of alleged breaches proved unsuccessful, they appeared adequate and appropriate in the circumstances: see paragraphs 99-101 above.

131 We consider that the Chief of Defence Force was inhibited in successfully investigating the "leaks" by the following factors -

131.1 Reliance on the command structure and on the force of orders in a managerial context. Some individual Army officers were prepared to disregard the orders in a way which would have been unthinkable to them in an operational context: see paragraph 100 above.

131.2 The decision not to investigate "leaks" apparently from the Army on the grounds that the investigation of those "leaks" was the responsibility of the CGS: see paragraph 101 above.

132 Our terms of reference do not require us to make any recommendations. We understand that this is because it is intended to refer our report to Mr Don Hunn to assist him in his major review of the accountabilities and structural arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force. Both you and Mr Hunn have suggested, however, that it would be helpful if we were to identify in our conclusions any matters arising from our inquiry which might be taken into account in Mr Hunn's review. This we now do.

133 It seems to us that in the context of the subject matter of our review there is a need for clear and decisive leadership at the top of the Defence Force and the Army to identify and remove or neutralise those individuals responsible for the breach of Defence Force standards and the unauthorised disclosure of official information. The recent appointments to those two positions have provided the Government with an ideal opportunity to ensure that the new leaders are not only of high professional competence but will also deal promptly and effectively with the culprits.

134 The terms of reference to be given by the Minister to the CDF when that officer takes up his appointment should state clearly and prominently that one of his principal responsibilities will be to take decisive steps to end this sorry saga. They must include a vigorous attempt to identify and remove or neutralise that small minority of officers who have participated in it; the expeditious reiteration to all personnel of their responsibilities in this area, and all practical means that can be taken to enhance and preserve respect for the accepted standards of behaviour. It should be made plain to the new CDF that the degree of his success in meeting this explicit requirement will be a major element in judging his performance.

135 In paragraph 101 above we referred to the existence of constraints on the powers of the Chief of Defence Force to carry out his responsibilities in relation to management as distinct from operational functions. In these management areas he has similar accountabilities to the Government as does any Chief Executive in the Public Service. He can, however, only perform this role through the Service Chiefs; yet since he does not appoint those Chiefs he has very limited disciplinary power over them and therefore less authority to ensure that his wishes are carried out. While this may not be a significant problem at times when all the senior officers concerned are working in harmony history has shown that this will not always be the case. It seems to us that this area - of heightening the effectiveness of accountability procedures within the Defence Force - needs to be considered further in the context of Mr Hunn's review.

136 One possible approach might be a change in the way Service Chiefs are appointed. In the latest round of appointments of CDF and Service Chiefs, the State Services Commissioner, with the assistance of an advisory panel, advised the Government of the candidates whom he believed were best qualified for the respective positions. The appointments were then approved by the Governor-General in Council. This procedure, for the first time followed the State Services model, except that whereas the State Services Commissioner formally appoints Departmental Chief Executives, who are then bound in a contractual relationship with him, the appointment of the Service Chiefs has been effected, as required by the Defence Act, through the issue of Warrants by the Governor-General. Consideration might now be given to aligning the two appointment processes a stage further - that, while the Governor-General in Council continues to approve the appointment of Single Service Chiefs, the Defence Act could be changed to provide for the appointment to be formally made by the CDF, bringing the Service Chiefs into the same kind of contractual relationship with CDF as the State Sector Chief Executives have now with the State Services Commissioner.

137 We anticipate that Mr Hunn will consider the need for structural changes at New Zealand Defence Force Headquarters and consequential legislative amendments to the Defence Act 1990. In the course of our inquiry we formed the view that the experience of the last decade indicates that consideration could usefully be given to other amendments of the Act including -

137.1 The nature and extent of the powers of the Chief of Defence Force to command all aspects of the Defence Force. (Current ambiguities should be removed).

137.2 The role and functions of the three Service Chiefs now that the Joint Forces Headquarters has been established.

137.3 The effectiveness of the command structure outside operational and related areas.

137.4 A requirement that by the end of a transitional period all appointments to senior positions should have Joint Forces experience.

138 If it is decided to make amendments to the Defence Act 1990, there are a number of further specific points which might be considered -

138.1 Clarification of the role of the Governor-General as Commander in Chief: see paragraph 70 above.

138.2 Inclusion of a specific provision requiring political neutrality of the Defence Force and briefing of the Leader of the Opposition to encourage a bipartisan approach to defence issues. There is a precedent for such a provision in the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969: see s 4AA.

139 The Defence Force should consider producing a simple, straightforward statement in booklet form describing clearly the obligations of all Defence personnel to observe political neutrality and to avoid the unauthorised disclosure of official information to anyone, whether or not in the media: see paragraphs 60 and 81 above. The Public Service Code of Conduct could be used as a model, but adapted to reflect the unique features of the Defence Force and to include the points made in the introduction to DFO 70. The contents of the booklet might usefully be prepared after consultation with members of the Defence Force using a "bottom up" approach.

140 The Defence Force should consider extending the education and training of its officer corps in all Services to include an appropriate course covering the essential features of the constitutional relationship between civilians and the military: see paragraph 64 above. The course already developed by the Director of Legal Services would be a valuable starting point. All appointees to New Zealand Defence Force Headquarters should have the benefit of such a course where the nature of their prior experience justified this.

141 The changing principles of Defence Force personnel - better educated, more questioning than their predecessors - suggest to us that there may be a need for some forms of safety valve. At the higher level, these might include a vehicle on the lines of the now discontinued Defence Quarterly which enabled them to advance views publicly in their personal capacity. For lower ranks as well as higher, there would be value in providing full opportunity to advance views on major impending policy issues, and to receive the feedback from their Service which would give those who took advantage of the process a feeling of ownership in the results.